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An increase in the taxation of foreign a¢ liates reduces domestic investment, as has recently been
empirically shown in Becker and Riedel (2012). This paper investigates the implication of this
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1 Introduction
What happens to a rms domestic activity if foreign activity is increased? Several recent stud-
ies empirically show that an increase in foreign activity (e.g., investment, employment, sales) is
associated with an increase in domestic activity.1 In Becker & Riedel (2012) we provide further
evidence for the complementarity of domestic and foreign investment by showing that an increase
in foreign taxes is associated with a decrease in domestic investment. In this paper, we explore
the implications of this nding for tax competition. If foreign taxes decrease domestic invest-
ment instead of increasing it, a central assumption of the classical tax competition literature
(starting with Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986) is put into question, and the welfare properties of
tax competition may fundamentally change.
We build a two-country model with purely national and multinational rms which only di¤er
in the location of their production facilities (purely national rms produce in one country only,
multinationals in two countries).2 If the share of multinational rms is reduced to zero, the model
becomes similar to the standard tax competition framework. We demonstrate that an increase
in the share of multinational rms may mitigate tax competition in the sense that equilibrium
taxes are higher.
2 The model
Consider a world with two countries, i = a; b. In each of the two countries, there is a repres-
entative household receiving utility from consumption of a homogeneous private good, Ci, and
a publicly provided good, Gi. The households utility function is given by
U i = U (Ci; Gi) (1)
The household is endowed with a xed amount of savings, denoted by k, which is invested
in the world capital market at an interest rate of r. Moreover, it owns all rms headquartered
in the country where it resides. Thus, the households income is given by rm prots, P , and
interest income. Its budget constraint reads
Ci = Pi + rk (2)
In each country, there is a large number of rms normalized to unity. A fraction  2 [0; 1] of
rms is multinational, i.e. produces in both countries, the complement 1  is purely national, i.e.
produces in one country only. Production needs two inputs, j = 1; 2, which both are produced
with capital denoted by K for multinational rms and k for national rms. Producing in both
countries means that one input good is produced in country a, the other in country b. We assume
that one unit of capital can be transformed into one unit of input good. Both types of rms
are assumed to produce the same homogeneous output good the price of which is normalized to
unity.
To start with, consider the national rms. Output in i is given by f i (:) and inputs by k1i . A
national rms after-tax prots  in country i are given by
i = f
i
 
k1i ; k
2
i
  (r + ti)  k1i + k2i  (3)
1These studies include Desai, Foley & Hines (2005, 2009), Barba Navaretti, Castellani & Disdier (2010) and
Simpson (2012).
2This assumption allows focussing on one specic aspect of multinationals: the geographically dispersed pro-
duction structure, although of course national and multinational rms di¤er in many other aspects.
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where ti denotes the source-based unit tax on capital. The rm chooses both capital stocks in
order to maximize its prots. The rst order conditions are f ij
 
k1i ; k
2
i

= r+ ti for j = 1; 2 where
f ij
 
k1i ; k
2
i
  @f  k1i ; k2i  =@kji .
Now, turn to the multinational rms. With the production function denoted by F i
 
K1i ;K
2
 i

and inputs by Kji , after-tax prots  are given by
i = F
i
 
K1i ;K
2
 i
  (r + ti)K1i + (r + t i)K2 i (4)
The rm choosesK1i andK
2
 i in order to maximize its prots. The prot maximizing stocks of
capital are implied by the two rst order conditions, F i1
 
K1i ;K
2
 i

= r + ti and F i2
 
K1i ;K
2
 i

=
r + t i. Note that, in this model, rms cannot shift prots for tax saving purposes (see the
corresponding discussion in Becker & Riedel, 2012).
Governments in both countries are assumed to be benevolent, i.e. to maximize their resident
households utility. They do so by optimally setting the source-based unit tax on capital use, ti,
which is their only tax instrument. The governments budget constraint is given by
Gi = ti
 
K1i +K
2
i

+ (1  ) ti
 
k1i + k
2
i

(5)
The interest rate is determined on the world capital market. Capital demand is given by the
two capital stocks of each rm, national and multinational, in each country, a and b. Capital
supply is given by the two savings endowments of the households in each country. In equilibrium,
supply has to meet demand:

 
K1a +K
2
b +K
1
b +K
2
a

+ (1  )  k1a + k2a + k1b + k2b = 2k (6)
where Kji = K
j
i (r; ti) and k
j
i = k
j
i (r; ti). Di¤erentiating the above equation over r, ti and t i
yields drdti =
dr
dt i
=   12 .
Optimal tax policy and tax competition
The benevolent government in country i maximizes its residents utility by optimally choosing
ti, i.e. it solves maxti U
i (Ci; Gi) subject to Ci = i + (1  )i + rk and Gi given in (5). The
rst order condition is given by
dW i
dti
=
 
U iG   U iC
 
K1i + (1  )
 
k1i + k
2
i

+ U iGK
2
i +
@W i
@r
dr
dti
+U iGti



dK1i
dti
+
dK2i
dti

+ (1  )

dk1i
dti
+
dk2i
dti

= 0 (7)
with @W
i
@r =  U iC


 
K1i +K
2
 i

+ (1  )  k1i + k2i   k which equals zero under the symmetry
assumption. Assume that the above equation holds in both countries, a and b, in a symmetric
equilibrium.
The central question of this paper is whether multinational rms make tax competition
more or less intense. For this purpose, we consider a variation of the parameter . As the
Appendix shows, di¤erentiation of dW
i
dti
= 0 and dW
 i
dt i
= 0 with respect to ti, t i, r and 
yields that dtid has the same sign as d

dW i
dti

=d which is given by @

dW i
dti

=@ = U iCK
2
i +
U iGti
h
dK1i
dti
+
dK2i
dti
  dk1idti  
dk2i
dti
i
. Using (A1) to (A4) from the Appendix and assumptions of
2
equal technology and symmetry, the above expression can be rewritten as
@
@
dW i
dti
= U iCK
2
i + U
i
Gti

F i12
2Zi
+
f i12
2z

(8)
where Zi = and zi =. We can thus state
Proposition 1 Increasing the share of multinational rms i) unambiguously increases equilib-
rium tax rates if the two inputs are complements, i.e. if f i12; F
i
12  0, ii) decreases equilibrium
tax rates if the two inputs are strong substitutes, f i12; F
i
12 < 0, such that the right hand side of
(8) becomes negative.3
Is the tax competition equilibrium described by (7) e¢ cient? To answer this question, we
consider a coordinated increase in taxes in both countries, such that dti = dt i = dt. The welfare
e¤ect in country i is given by dW = dW
i
dti
dti +
dW i
dt ii
dt i. Starting from the uncoordinated tax
competition equilibrium in which dW
i
dti
= 0 the welfare e¤ect is given by
dW i
dt
=
dW i
dt i
=  U iCK2 i + U iGti



dK1i
dt i
+
dK2i
dt i

+ (1  )

dk1i
dt i
+
dk2i
dt i

(9)
Note rstly that, if  = 0, the externality is purely scal and unambiguously positive. This
implies that tax rates are ine¢ ciently low in the tax competition equilibrium. An increase in
the share of multinational rms reduces the externality if @@
dW i
dt i
< 0 with @@
dW i
dt i
=  U iCK2 i +
U iGti
h
dK1i
dt i
+
dK2i
dt i
  dk1idt i  
dk2i
dt i
i
. Again, this expression can be simplied using the symmetry
assumption to @@
dW i
dt i
=  U iCK2 i   U iGti
h
F i12
2Zi
+
fi12
2z
i
. Thus, if an increase in  increases the
equilibrium tax rates, it reduces the externality. Thus, @@
dW i
dt i
= @@
dW i
dti
, see equation (8). We
can now state
Corollary 2 Starting from  = 0, an increase in the share of multinational rms, , (i) improves
e¢ ciency if the two inputs are complements, i.e. if f i12; F
i
12  0, and ii) deteriorates e¢ ciency
if the two inputs are strong substitutes, f i12; F
i
12 < 0, such that  U iCK2 i  U iGti
h
F i12
2Zi
+
fi12
2z
i
> 0.
In Becker & Riedel (2012), we found empirically that dK
j
i
dt i
< 0. Thus, in the framework of this
model, an increase in the share of multinational rms unambiguously mitigates tax competition.
Moreover, if  approaches unity, tax competition would imply overtaxation. There is something
like an optimallevel of multinational rm share that renders tax competition e¢ cient.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we started from the empirical nding that taxes on foreign a¢ liates reduce domestic
investment and asked for the implications for tax competition. We considered a model with purely
national and multinational rms and showed that an increase in the share of multinational rms
may mitigate tax competition and increase equilibrium tax rates. For the purpose of clarity, we
3 If F i12; f
i
12 = 0, the right hand side of (8) is unambiguously positive due to the so-called foreign rm ownership
e¤ect, see Huizinga & Nielsen (1997). The existence of multinational rms imply that foreigners own capital in
a given jurisdiction. Then, part of the tax burden may be exported which increases the incentive to increase
source-based taxes.
3
abstracted from prot shifting and other aspects of international investment (see Becker, Fuest
& Riedel, forthcoming, for an extensive discussion). An implication of the above derived results
is that the role of multinational rms for the future of national tax policies may have be revised.
Instead of undermining the national capacity of levying source-based taxes, complementarities
of headquarters and a¢ liate production may actually reduce the pressure from international tax
competition.
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Appendix
Comparative statics w.r.t. kji and K
j
i
This appendix provides some comparative statics. Di¤erentiating f i1
 
k1i ; k
2
i

= r + ti and
f i2
 
k1i ; k
2
i

= r + ti over ki, ti and r gives dk1i =
fi22 fi12
zi
dr +
fi22 fi12
zi
dti and dk2i =
fi11 fi21
zi
dr +
fi11 fi21
zi
dti where zi = f i11f
i
22   f i12f i21 > 0, which is required for stability.
Di¤erentiating F i1
 
K1i ;K
2
 i

= r + ti and F i2
 
K1i ;K
2
 i

= r + t i over Ki, K i, ti, t i and
r gives dK1i =
F i22 F i12
Zi
dri +
F i22
Zi
dti   F
i
12
Zi
dt i and dK2 i =
F i11 F i21
Zi
dr   F i21Zi dti +
F i11
Zi
dt i where
Zi = F
i
11F
i
22   F i12F i21 > 0, which is required for stability.
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With drdti =
dr
dt i
=   12 , we can then rewrite the above equations as tax e¤ects accounting for
interest rate changes:
dk1i
dti
=
f i22   f i12
2zi
and
dk1i
dt i
=  f
i
22   f i12
2zi
(A1)
dk2i
dti
=
f i11   f i21
2zi
and
dk2i
dt i
=  f
i
11   f i21
2zi
(A2)
as well as
dK1i
dti
=
F i22 + F
i
12
2Zi
and
dK1i
dt i
=  F
i
22 + F
i
12
2Zi
(A3)
dK2 i
dti
=  F
i
11   F i21
2Zi
and
dK2 i
dt i
=
F i11   F i21
2Zi
(A4)
Comparative statics w.r.t.  i
Assume that dW
i
dti
= 0 and dW
 i
dt i
= 0 describe a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Consider the
e¤ect of a small increase in  on equilibrium tax rates which can be derived by di¤erentiating
dW i
dti
= 0 and dW
 i
dt i
= 0 with respect to ti, t i, r and . Due to symmetry, we can simplify the
problem using dti = dt i, d

dW i
dti

=dti = d

dW i
dt i

=dt i and d

dW i
dti

=dt i = d

dW i
dt i

=dti.
Di¤erentiation then yields
dti
d
=  
d

dWi
dti

d
d

dWi
dti

dti
+
d

dWi
dti

dt i
(A5)
with
d

dWi
dti

dti
+
d

dWi
dti

dt i
< 0 which is straightforward to show.
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